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the moral principle that unnecessary pain is wrong, and
obviously the soundness of any argument using the
principle depends on what is meant by the terms
'unnecessary' and ·pain.' The term 'unnecessary' can
refer to either: (a) an end that is itself unnecessary (and,
therefore, whatever pain is endured in gaining the end
is afortiori unnecessary); or (b) an unnecessary means
to a necessary end (namely, the means is unnecessary
because another means is available). My concern in
this paper is with the second interpretation, and so I
can make only a few brief remarks about the frrst,2
Although the term •pain' functions in both, its analysis
is best undertaken as part of the longer, fuller analysis.
Briefly, regarding unnecessary ends, since in the
vegetarian argument the end is adequate human
nutrition, the end is not unnecessary if human beings
are to survive. In contrast to adequate nutrition, more
obviously unnecessary ends are using animals for
decoration (taxidermy), symbols of social status (furs
and exotic birds), and entertainment (rodeos). These
latter ends are nonessential for human survival and
suitable substitutes are readily available for achieving
the same ends. In contrast, nutrition is significantly
necessary: humans cannot be healthy and free of
suffering without it, we eventually will die without it,
other ends are severely limited when we are unhealthy
or suffering, and other ends are impossible when we
are dead. Nutrition is obviously not a fmal end in itself

"The meat we eat is no more nourishing than
the grain the animals are fed."
-James Rachels, "Vegetarianism and
'The Other Weight Problem'," p. 185.
"...whatever else be true, whether there be gods
or only atoms, whether men are significantly
superior to non-human animals or no, whether
there be life to come or this poor accident be
all, this at least cannot be true, that it is proper
to be the cause of avoidable ill. There may be
other moral principles than this, but this at least
is dogma. And if this minimal principle be
accepted, there is no other honest course than
the immediate rejection of all flesh-foods and
most bio-medical research."
-Stephen R. L. Clark, The Moral Status
ofAnimals, p. xiii.
Introduction

PHILOSOPHY

This paper is an analysis of one of the main moral
arguments for vegetarianism, the vegetarian argument
from unnecessary pain. This argument is derived from
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but is a means to some further ends, such as a healthful
life or the Good Life. Although the Good Life can be
achieved without rodeos and stuffed, mounted animal
corpses, it cannot be achieved without adequate food.
According to classical hedonistic utilitarianism, the
end to be maximized is pleasure, not human nutrition.
If pleasure is the summum bonum and all pleasures are
equal, including human and other animal pleasures, then
adequate human nutrition as an end should be
overridden in all cases where greater pleasure would
result from human malnutrition and death, including
perhaps the demise of the entire human species. As I
argue below, the mere plausibility of this argument is a
reductio ad absurdum for hedonistic utilitarianism.
I take it that there can be no serious objection to the
necessity as an end of adequate human nutrition, and
so this first reading of the term 'unnecessary' wiu not
be pursued further. I turn now to may main concern in
this paper.

This argument has convinced many to be vegetarians,
but is it sound? It needs careful analysis for conceptual,
logical, and empirical correctness. Based on the more
questionable claim in each, I am labeling the three
subarguments, respectively, the Empirical Argument
from Nutrition, the Empirical Argument from Pain, and
the Moral Argument from Unnecessary Pain.
The Empirical Argument from Nutrition 3

In the Empirical Argument from Nutrition, the
formal structure of the argument is valid. In other
words, if the premises (1.10, 1.20) were unambiguously
true, then theconclusioo that meat-eating is unnecessary
(1.30) would follow from the premises. Logically: p
is 'necessary' for q if and only if q will not obtain
withoutp; and,p is 'unnecessary' for q if q will obtain
withoutp, that is, if there is another possible cause for
q. In the Empirical Argument from Nutrition, the goal
is adequate nutrition, and two means are allegedly
possible, a meat diet and a vegetarian diet. The
presumed availability of the vegetarian diet makes the
meat diet "unnecessary." The logic of this argument is
indisputable. However, I argue below that the
conclusion does not follow because Premise 1.10
confusingly equivocates what is meant by "vegetarian"
and "adequate." Literally as stated, Premise 1.10 is
either false or ambiguous, and therefore must be revised.
Vegetarianism is not even initially plausible unless
the diet is nutritionally adequate (1.10). Despite the
claim's central importance, often it is merely asserted
without qualification or support, as by James Rachels
when he states, "The meat we eat is no more nourishing
than the grain the animals are fed."4 Most discussions
favoring vegetarianism give the claim only cursory
treatment, usually by citing as proof the large numbers
of vegetarians who are "hale and thriving."5 Worldclass athletes, Hindus, Seventh-Day Adventists, and
Trappist monks often are listed as evidence of the diet's
healthfulness.6
Obviously this is an inductive hasty generalization:
the empirical fact that some vegetarians are healthy does
not prove that all humans--or even most humans--will
be healthy on a vegetarian diet. Minimum Daily
Requirements (MDRs) vary from person to person and
from ethnic group to ethnic group. Just as particular
individuals and ethnic groups are susceptible (or
immune) to certain diseases (such as sickle cell anemia
and skin cancer), particular individuals and ethnic

The Extended Argument

The second reading of 'unnecessary' requires a
"multiple means" calculus in which two or more means
are contrasted according to the principle of unnecessary
pain. The result is an extended argument involving three
steps, as outlined below:
I

1.10 A vegetarian diet is adequate for human
nutrition.
1.20 A meat (omnivorous) diet is adequate for
human nutrition.
1.30 Therefore, a meat (omnivorous) diet is
unnecessary for human nutrition. (From
1.10,1.20)

II
1.40 A vegetarian diet causes no pain to the
animals.
1.40 A meat diet causes pain to the animals.
1.60 Therefore, a meat diet causes unnecessary
pain. (From 1.30, 1.40, 1.50)
III

1.70 Causing unnecessary pain is wrong.
1.80 Therefore, a meat diet is wrong. (From
1.60, 1.70)
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groups (especially those from colder climates
traditionally dependent on large quantities of meat and
dairy products) may require more of the nutrients found
in meat due to centuries of high meat consumption and
natural selection. Their gastrointestinal tracts may not
digest and absorb adequate nutrients from purely
nonanimal sources. Moreover, of the "hale and
thriving" vegetarians cited as proof, most are not strict
vegetarians (vegans) but rather eat eggs (ovovegetarians) or milk products (lactovegetarians) or both
(ovolactovegetarians). In addition, many take vitamin
and nutrient supplements, and many have suffered illhealth from their dieL For instance, cited by Jane Brody
as proof of the healthfulness of vegetarianism,' Bill
Walton, star of the Portland Trailblazers, suffered
numerous bone fracture problems due to his diet. 8
Despite the fact that three-fourths of them took
supplements, a recent nutritional analysis of ovolactovegetarian Trappist monks found that "a number
of the subjects had low intakes of some nutrients,
particularly the B-vitamins and calcium, iron,
magnesium, and zinc. "9
Listed below are several empirical facts lO that limit
the scope of Proposition 1.10: .

when they stop producing? To get the milk, cows
must have calves. What happens to the calves,
especially the bull-<:alves? Moreover, unprocessed
eggs and milk have significant amounts of
saturated fats and cholesterol, which contribute
to heart disease, and many people are unable to
eat dairy products due to a lactose intolerance.
The B-12 in eggs is in the cholesterol-laden yolk,
not the protein-rich egg white that can be eaten
without danger. An alternative would be to rely
on vitamin supplements.
3. Vegetarians are at risk of developing Iron
Deficiency Anemia because only 5-10 percent
of the iron in vegetables is absorbed during
digestion. The large amounts of fiber in
vegetarian diets bind up the iron preventing
absorption. In contrast, via a different biochemical process, 10-30 percent of the iron in
meat is absorbed. Although the iron is readily
available in vegetables, a haphazard diet will be
deficient. As with B-12, vitamin supplements
may be taken; but, unlike B-12, iron can be toxic.
Iron supplements can also cause gastrointestinal
disturbances.

1. Vitamin B-12 is an essential nutrient and
naturally occurs only in animal products (meat,
eggs, and dairy products). Absent from humans,
microorganisms in the intestines of other animals
synthesize the vitamin. Deficiency in B-12
causes Pernicious Anemia, gastrointestinal
disorders, neurological impairment, and
eventually death. Consequently, vegans must
supplement their diet with vitamin pills, tempeh
or miso (soy) fennented with the Klebsiella
bacteria, yeast grown on media rich in B-12, or
foods artificially fortified with B-12. Forthese
reasons, many vegetarians are ovolactovegetarians.

4. Increased amounts of iron are required by
menstruating women, pregnant women,
adolescent boys and girls, and old people
(usually due to small amounts of internal
bleeding)-that is, all age groups except adult
males. Vegetarians in these groups are especially
at risk of developing Iron Deficiency Anemia
and therefore are advised by authorities to
monitor their diets closely or else take
supplements.
5. Pregnant women and nursing women who are
vegetarians are especially susceptible to
deficiencies in all the B vitamins. They should
consume eggs, dairy products, or supplements.

2. If the worldwide human population depended
solely on eggs and dairy products for balanced
nutrition, huge additional quantities would be
needed. For example, three whole eggs or three
cups of whole milk (or seven cups of skim milk)
must be consumed to obtain the MDR of B-12.
Without meat in the diet, hens and cows would
have to be exploited far beyond currenllevels.
What should be done with the hens and cows
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6. Infants and preschool children need animal
protein, at least eggs or dairy products. Even
with an ovolactovegetarian diet, they may also
need supplements. Vegan infants and children
are usually malnourished, underweight, and
neurologically underdeveloped. Nevertheless.
with careful attention to their children's diets,
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some vegans have been able to raise healthy
preschool children.

mineral supplements are taken, a vegetarian
diet (vegan, ovovegetarian, lactovegetarian,
or ovolactovegetarian) is usually adequate
f<y human nutrition. (Conjunction of 1.10a-d)

7. Protein needs vary depending upon stress,
disease, injury, loss of sleep, activity, and other
factors. Although adequate protein normallycan
be obtained from complementary vegetable
sources, the protein in cereals, legumes, and nuts
is less digestible and less balanced than that in
meat, eggs, and milk.

Moreover, in severecircumstances when the supplemented
vegan or ovolactovegetarian diets are unavailable, such
as in underdeveloped nations and during poverty or
drought, even this revision would fail, and the meat
diet would be circumstantially necessary.
To keep the argument sound, this revision of Premise
1.10 requires a revision of the conclusion. The
following is a revision of the entire argument:

8. Vegan diets are also especially susceptible to
deficiencies in calcium, riboflavin, Vitamin
A,and Vitamin D because these are in short
supply in vegetables. Susceptible to osteoporosis, all vegan women must carefully monitor
their calcium intake since they consume no dairy
products. Supplements from nonanimal sources,
however, are readily available.

l.l0e Except for pregnant women, infants, and
small children, and only if vitamin and
mineral supplements are taken, a vegetarian
diet (vegan, ovovegetarian, lactovegetarian,
or ovolactovegetarian) is usually adequate
for human nutrition.

Based on these eight empirical factors, either
Proposition 1.10 is literally false or it ambiguously
equivocates the scope and meaning of the terms
"vegetarian" and "adequate." To be true, the claim must
be revised to one of the following propositions:

1.20

1.30a Therefore, except for pregnant women,
infants, and small children, and only if
vitamin and mineral supplements are taken,
a meat (omnivorous) diet usually is
unnecessary for human nutrition. (From
l.l0e,1.20)

I.lOa Except for pregnant women, infants, and
small children, and only if vitamin and
mineral supplements are included, a vegan
diet is usually adequate for human nutrition.
1.10b An ovovegetarian diet is usually adequate
for human nutrition but may require vitamin
and mineral supplements.
1.1Oc

I think that these revisions significantly weaken and
undermine the entire vegetarian agenda. Without a
source for vitamin B-12 (usually eggs, milk product.",
or supplements), all vegetarians will become
malnourished; and, without careful attention to iron in
the diet or iron supplements, all age groups except adult
males are at risk ofbecoming malnourished. All vegans
are especially at risk: in both regards. Vitamin B-12
deficiency and iron deficiency may take several years
to appear and can be life-threatening; surely 00 one
should run the risk. One's life quality can be marke.dly
diminished for years, and recovery can be very slow.
For most people, vegetarianism will not provide an
adequate diet unless supplements are taken.
Accordingly, the advice of many vegetarian authorities
is to play it safe and take a supplement. From a moral
perspective, I think that the vegetarian diet is so risky
that no one should impose it on another person.

A lactovegetarian diet is usually adequate
for human nutrition but may require vitamin
and mineral supplements.

1.10<1 An ovolactovegetarian diet is usually
adequate for human nutrition but may
require vitamin and mineral supplements.
Incorporating all of these necessary revisions (1.10ad) into one fully qualified (and hence true) proposition,
Premise 1.10 now becomes:
l.l0e Except for pregnant women, infants, and
small children, and only if vitamin and
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Vegetarian parents face a particularly difficult dilemma:
Should they compromise their moral beliefs by
providing animal foods for their children, or should they
risk malnutrition and underdeveloped children?
In addition to the empirical difficulties regarding
Premise 1.10, the argument also involves significant
conceptual confusion in the move from "adequate for
human nutrition" in the premises (1.l0e, 1.20) to
"unnecessary for human nutrition" in the conclusion
(1.30a). To help you see my point, consider the
following diets:
Kathy:

fruitcake, and coconut pie, all of which collectively
make up part of her "adequate" diet.
Perhaps by now my point is evident: the notions of
"adequate," "necessary," "natural," and ''balanced'' are
perhaps hopelessly ambiguous and imprecise. The
confusion seems to be located in the singulardistributive and wholistic-collective aspects of the
concepts. For example: as a distributive, singular
component of a diet, whiskey may be "unnecessary"
because it lacks most nutrients other than calories and
can be replaced by more nutritious foods; but, as a
component in a coUective whole, the calories from the
alcohol may be "necessary." Hence, the alcohol could
be "dislributively unnecessary" while being "collectively
necessary." Moreover, except for highly refined foods
like breakfast bars and astronaut cookies, no food taken
singularly would be "adequate." As already noted,
supplements can make virtually any diet "adequate," a
fact that partly explains the current obsession with
health foods and vitamins.
I do not think that it would be very helpful to
continue to try to sort out these conceptual confusions,
even if it were possible. Neither totally distinct nor
completely free ofequivocation, the relevant questions
apparently are three: I) What is a "nonnal" diet? 2)
What is a "balanced" diet? 3) what foods are "naturally
(routinely and regularly) available"? The complicated
answers to these questions involve evolutionary,
biosocial, physiological, nutritional, genetic, agricultural,
ecological, socioeconomic, historico-temporal, and
cultural aspects. For example, Scandinavians may be
dependent upon seafood and dairy products if they are
going to have balanced diets that can be produced
naturally, regularly, ecologically, and economically in
their harsh, cold climate. By way of contrast, due to
the semidesert ecosystem and depending on population
density, West Texans would probably have to depend
upon range-fed animals such as cattle or sheep,
especially during droughts and after the subterranean
water sources currently used for irrigation are
exhausted.
Deep ecologists predict that the best-and perhaps
only-Iong-tenn agriculture for our environmentalJy
crippled planet will be one where each local,
ecologically autonomous bio-region produces "native"
flora and fauna to feed its own population. Overpopulated regions will have to depopulate, and all
people will eat primarily locally produced foods, which
seldom occurs today except in underdeveloped

Peanut butter, microwave biscuits, Big
Macs, Diet Coke, candy bars, ice cream,
and One-A-Day Plus Minerals vitamins.

George: Steak, potatoes, coffee, beer, and whiskey.
Dan:

Meat and dairy products only due to rare,
life-threatening allergy prohibiting all
vegetable protein.

Alice:

All four basic food groups as recommended by the U. S. Food and Drug
Administration.

Bill Runningbear: Fish, seafood, caribou, and other
meats from Arctic wildlife.
All of these diets are conceivably "adequate",especially
if supplements are taken, as in Kathy's case.
Supplements can make almost any diet "adequate." For
Kathy, supplements are probably "necessary" to her
"adequate" diet. Moreover, George can argue that
whiskey is "necessary" to his diet since otherwise he
might not get enough total calories. Kathy can similarly
contend that Big Macs and candy bars are ''necessary.''
Caloric deficiency is one fonn of malnutrition; adequate
caloric intake is essential. In different senses, meat is
"necessary" to both Bill's and Dan's diets: Bill's Arctic
environment will not grow vegetables, and Dan's allergy
prohibits vegetables. Also in different senses, Bill and
Dan have "natural" diets: Bill's diet is restricted by his
"natural" environment, and Dan's is limited due to a
"natural" genetic deficiency. Probably Alice's diet is
the only one that is "naturally" "balanced" and thereby
"adequate," but her daily diet includes meat and would
usually include items that are neither stric tly
"necessary" nor "natural," such as processed margarine
and refined sugar. Her diet also occasionally includes
"unnecessary" foods like chocolate chip cookies,
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nations, Perhap.'S the well-to-do of the future will eat
like today's Japanese and the poor like today's Chinese.
Despite the empirical provisos and conceptual
confusions, vegetarians may still contend that today
most humans have a general duty not to eat meat
because eggs and dairy products do not require killing
the animals, supplements are readily available, and
physicians can monitor one's health. Although prior
generations may have been exempt and some
underdeveloped nations may still be, modern
pharmaceutical and medical technologies have now
made vegetarianism healthy for virtually all people.
Our culture has outgrown meat-eat.ing.
Several reasons may make meat-eaters reject this
general duty. First, worldwide ovolactovegetarianism
(UOb-d) would produce problems of unimaginable
scope, especially if people were not permitted to eat
the unproductive hens, CO'NS, andcalves. The animals would
probably suffer hambly. Mxoover, hem and cows would
not do very wen in many climates, either drastically
draining dle resources or requiring imported products.
Second, the vegan diet requires careful attention and
supplements. Many people may find it to be too much
trouble, too risky. Until our culture widely adopts and
markets the diet, most people are probably too ignorant
and uninformed to be adequately nourished. But this is
surely only a transitional problem that can be remedied
by education and marketing. In itself, having to pay
close attention to nutrition in one's diet can also
characterize meat-eaters, who can also be malnourished
if their diets are not balanced. Mere inconvenience does
not justify actions that are otherwise immoral.
Next, vegetarianism might work well for the middle
classes but probably would put at risk the health of the
laboring classes, who require more nutrients, purchase
cheaper foods, are less educated, and are more
habituated to the staple diet of their cultures-to the
"meat and potatoes" or "pork and rice" diets. Many
poor people, especially the rural poor, raise animals for
food. They can raise a pig or have chickens with liUle
more than garbage and table scraps. Admiuedly many
poor people, especially the urban poor, could purchase
more food and be better fed if they did not buy so many
expensive meat products, which they now mistakenly
think they need in large quantities. Despite vegetarians'
hopes of feeding the starving, impoverished masses
with the grain now fed to livestock, vegetarianism is a
middle-class movement The nutritional, ecological,
and agri-economic feasibility of widespread
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vegetarianism is questionable. So far, vegetarianism
largely has been parasitic upon meat-eating cultures.
Finally, relying upon pharmaceutical companies
for essential food-namely, vitamin and mineral
supplements-may be technological madness. Is
anyone morally required to depend upon pharmaceutical
companies for health or nutritional peace of mind?
Although readily available today in the developed
nations, only a few generations ago these supplements
were not widely available-and continue to be
unavailable in many parts of the world. Perhaps
someday on this planet people will consume plastic
meals artificially synthesized on huge chemical farms,
but such ~l time hopefully will never occur, at least not
by choice. We are by nature omnivores. The farm and
garden c:ontinue to capture most of our idyllic
imaginations; we surround ourselves with pets, trees,
shrubbery, and flowers. To give up natural foods for
supplements would be to lose part of our hereditary,
biosocial, aesthetic, and perhaps mental health. The
point is this: we may be forced by economic and
ecological pressures to consume less and less natural
animal products, but it is nutritionally unrealistic to
expect our overpopulated planet to flourish on either
vegan or ovolactovegetarian diets.

The Empirical Argument from Pain
Next in the extended argument, the tenn "pain" is
added to the term "unnecessary" in the Empirical
Argument from Pain. This sub-argument provides an
empirical transition from the empirical nonnecessity of
the meat diet to the moral Principle of Unnecessary Pain.
Give the availability of a balanced vegetarian diet,
meat-eating is in fact "unnecessary" for adequate
nutrition (1.30, 1.30a). But even if meat-eating is in
fact unnecessary for nutrition, vegetarianism does not
follow unless pain also results. Meat-eating would be
wrong according to the Principle of Unnecessary Pain
only if the meat diet does in fact produce pain in the
animals (1.50) and only if the meat diet causes more
pain than the vegetarian diet (1.40). In other words,
for the Principle of Unnecessary Pain to apply, there
must be a conjunction of three empirically true
propositions: (1) "A meat diet is unnecessary for human
nutrition" (1.30), (2) "The vegetarian diet causes no
pain in the animals" (1.40), and (3) "The meat diet
causes pain in the animals" (1.50). These propositions
need careful examination.
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raising and slaughtering animals for meat would cause
the animals at least some pain-perhaps minisculeeven though on balance they would live heavenly lives.
Since meat is not needed for nutrition (1.30, 1.30a),
even this miniscule pain would be unnecessary. The
obvious criticism of the interpretation is that the
pleasure would vastly outweigh the pain-for the
animals and humans. Unless animals have some status
that prohibits exploiting and killing them, this first
interpretation fails.
Second, Proposition 1.50 could mean that, ifanimals
are mised and slaughtered for meat, the life of each
animal in itself would have on balance more pain than
pleasure to the individual animal. Although perhaps
when human benefits are added the total balance might
be positive, the animals themselves have miserable
lives. They are mere means to our ends. When we do
not need the meat (1.30, 1.3Qa), it would be cruel to
inflict such pain on the animals merely to satisfy our
taste for flesh, as Rachels argues. In comparable cases
where the lives of the animals on balance will be bad
for the animals, such as stray dogs and severely diseased
pets, we consider it our duty to euthanize the animals.
Moreover, if we will not provide humane care to our
pets, we regard it as our duty not to indulge in having
them. Even if the moral aspect of this interpretation
were unquestionably true, namely, if it were our duty
to prevent animals from living lives that are on balance
bad for the animals, the empirical aspect of this
interpretation, namely, that the food animals live such
lives, would still be questionable, especially when the
animals are raised on traditional farms. Even by today's
intensive methods, except for battery chickens, tethered
sows, and veal calves, most food animals during their
lives probably experience individually more net
pleasure than pain.
Do we have a duty to prevent animals from living
lives that are on balance bad for the animals? If this is
a strict duty, then we must police wild nature, preventing
predation except in optimal cases, feeding the hungry,
caring for the diseased, rescuing the misfortunate, and
so on. Such duties to the wild, if taken seriously, would
quickly exhaust our economic resources and probably
destroy our civilization. In contrast to wild nature, we
surely do have such duties to our pets because we choose
to have the pets and thereby enter into implicit contracts
to provide for their needs in exchange for their being
our pets. We do not have to have the pets. Not to care
for them, or to kill them prematurely for our

As already established, meat-eating is in fact
unnecessary for human nutrition only if the vegetarian
diet includes eggs, milk products, or vitamin and
mineral supplements (1.lOa-e, 1.30a). Worldwide
ovolactovegetarianism, as argued earlier, is both
impractical and exploitive of the animals. Although
eggs and milk can be humanely and economically
produced in some bio-regions as part ofpluralistic crop
ecology, worldwide dependence would result in
ecological stress, increased agricultural monism, and
immense pain for many of the animals, especially the
old, unproductive ones. Surely slaughter would be more
humane than abandoning the unproductive animals.
Feeding the unproductive would consume valuable
resources in a poorly diversified agricultural system
overburdened by producing enough milk and eggs for
the huge population of ovolactovegetarians. The
problems we now have from abandoned pets make
me doubt whether our society would provide humane
care for unproductive cows and hens. The animal pain
resulting from worldwide ovolactovegetarianism
would surely be greater than that of a humane
carnivorous world.
These considerations show that, if vegetarianism
were adopted by a large population, most would have
to be vegans. Therefore, when considered on a widespread scale, Proposition lAO is best regarded as false,
except for veganism. It should be revised as follows:
lAOa

A vegan diet causes no pain to the animals.

But as already noted, the protein content in the vegan
diet is inadequate for many people, notably pregnant
women, infants, and small children, and all vegans
would need vitamin B-12 supplements. In a vegan
world, B-12 might become a priceless commodity,
although technological wizardry would hopefully come
to the rescue. Perhaps eggs and milk would be produced
for those requiring the extra protein, although
technology might again meet the need. Nevertheless,
animals probably would still be needed in some limited
or severe situations, such as in impoverished regions
and during droughts.
We now come to the claim that meat-eating causes
pain, Proposition 1.50. This claim is conceptually
ambiguous, having several possible and somewhat
arbitrary meanings. I examine three of these.
First, it could mean that, even on the most
conceivably humane and delightful animal farm,
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convenienc.e, would be to break the oontract, to betray
the relationship we have with them.
One might object that the oontract is not with the
pets because they are not moral agents and so are not
the kind of beings with whom we can make even
implicit reciprocal contracts. All we break are our
intentions, assuming we intended to keep the pets for a
long time. If there is a contract at all, it is merely with
ourselves. Although this objection makes important
points, it still seems to me that people are wicked when
they plan to ldll their pets prematurely for trivial reasons,
such as not wanting to pay while on vacation for the
pet's room and board. or desiring the animals only while
they are frisky puppies or kittens.
But do such duties extend beyond pets to domestic
food animals? Given the availability of an adequate
vegetarian diet, we do not have to have the food animals.
As with pets, we choose to have them. Therefore, surely
we owe them at least humane treatment-that their lives
be on balance good. But would killing them
prematurely constitute betrayal? Unlike our pets, we
have the food animals for the pwpose of raising them
for slaughter. Our intent throughout is to kill and eat
them. They would not exist otherwise, and we have
not even tacitly entered into a contract to provide for
their needs beyond the optimal time of slaughter.
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A not uncommon case, morally interesting but
equally sad, is the food animal that is made into a pet,
often by children as 4-H or FFA educational projects.
When these animals are slaughtered, conceivably both
the child and the animal are betrayed and harmed.
Another duty to pets, and perhaps to other animals,
is the duty to educate them. Probably not self-conscious
in the wild, many animals may develop self·
consciousness, heightened rationality, and even a
reciprocal sense of moral duty while loved and trained
by their owners in the human sociocultural environment. l1 Notable examples are seeing-eye dogs and
chimpanzees. Ironically and inconsistently, it is
precisely because animals have these capacities that they
are desired as pets, and it is because they do not that
they are exploited. As with uncivilized and uneducated
human slaves, serfs, peasants, and laborers, we can leave
the animals wild and untrained, thereby providing ad
hoc grounds for exploiting and slaughtering the
mindless brutes. We can also breed and socially
condition both humans and animals to be inferior,
tranquil, stupid, and aesthetically disgusting, thereby
easing our elitist consciences.
Proposed by Holmes Rolston, III, the "homologous
principle" asserts that, when we choose to domesticate
animals, our minimal duty is to guarantee that they will
live lives that are at least as good as, and as pain free
as, their lives would have been in the wild. 12 Moreover,
their deaths by our hands must be at least as pain free
as the deaths that they would have suffered in the wild.
Rolston's principle correctly emphasizes that optional
human actions ought to increase the net balance of good
in the world, not decrease it. What I find unacceptable
about the principle is that it permits doing intrinsically
wrong actions in order to bring about optional goods, a
point that I will develop more fully later.
Third and fmally, Proposition 1.50 could mean that,
when animals are raised and slaughtered for meat, the
net calculus ofoombined pleasures and pains, in~luding
both animal and human pleasures and pains, is negative.
This empirical claim is questionable, as argued below.
In order to imagine the multitude of factors involved,
consider the following thought experiment. The
question is a conflict of two worlds: WI is a vegetarian
world, and W2 is a meat-eating, omnivorous world. If
we assume that in both worlds human nutritional needs
are met, then what is the relevant hedonistic difference
between the two worlds? WI has the pleasure derived
from vegetarian dishes without the pain w animals;
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whereas, W2 has the pleasure derived from meat-eating

The animals would not exist and would not enjoy any
life if they were not to be eaten.
Some vegetarians urge that WI would produce
millions of happy animals in the wild on lands now
used for pasture and animal feed. Nature is not "red in
tooth and claw" because most species are herbivores,
not carnivores. Less cultivation would free vast
acreages for reforestation, wilderness, and wildlife.
Despite these idyllic wishes, even if we could return
the land to its aboriginal innocence. animal populations
and pleasures would probably not be maximized
thereby. Animals in the wild often suffer-from disease,
malnutrition, stress and predation. Moreover, many
wild species flourish in greater numbers and health in a
mixed rural-wilderness. Rolston states:

plus whatever pleasure the animals experience during
their lifetimes lessened by whatever pain the animals
experience.

W}-Animals are not raisedfor food
No relevant animal pain.
No relevant animal pleasure.
Human pleasure from vegetable dishes.

W2 -Animals are raisedfor food:
Animal pleasures while alive.
Animal pains while alive.
Animal pains during slaughtering.
Human pleasure from vegetable dishes.
Human pleasure from meat dishes.

The climax forest of 31'1 ecosystemic succession
is usually not suited for the maximum number
and kinds of fauna and flora, and this
succession can be interrupted by agriculture
with benefit to those natural species that prefer
fields and edging. There are more deer in
Virginia now than when the Indians inhabited
its visually unbroken forests, and that is
probably true of cottontails, bobwhites, and
meadowlarks. Suitable habitat for all but a
few of the wildest creatures can be made
consistent with the rural use of land. 14

In what sense can we say that one world is better or
worse than the other? In W2, if the animals are raised
humanely and slaughtered mercifully, their lives on
balance would yield more pleasure than pain. To this
pleasure would then have to be added the pleasure of
the meat dishes. Therefore, W2 would have on balance
more pleasure than Wl-except when the food animals
are mistreated.
In estimating the utility calculus, the pleasures of
the food animals themselves must be taken into account.
If the animals raised in W2 were also raised but not
slaughtered, then billions of the vegetarian world would
surely have more pleasure. But, if no one ate meat,
then billions of animals would not exist and would not
experience any pleasure. Most food animals could not
survive in the wild, and society surely would not pay
for their food and veterinary costs. An oversight of
some vegetarians is to desire the healthy animal
populations of W 2 without the pain of killing.
Admittedly, the continued pleasurable existence of any
particular animal in W2 would make W2 a better world,
but W2 would not exist and that animal would not exist
ifW2 were not carnivorous. The utility contrast should
be between WI and W2, not between different possible
states of W2 . In addition, in W2 when the particular
animal is killed and eaten, it is usually replaced by
another animal that experiences pleasure until it, too,
is killed and replaced. This is the so-called
"replaceability argument."13 In other words, by virtue
of the fact that it is a carnivorous world, W2 sustains a
level ofpleasure (reduced by the animals' pain) that on
balance is probably higher than the vegetarian world.
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Consequently. the best hedonistic world is some version
ofW2. one with both wild and domestic animals suitably
balanced by the agricultural and ecological sciences.
Moreover, it seems that a pleasure-pain calculus
taken by itself would require that we eat meat. Because
W2 results on balance in more pleasure than W h we
are obligated by utility considerations to eat meat.
Unless animals have some status (or intrinsic value)
that would prohibit their slaughter for food, we are not
only free to eat meat but are obligated to do so. Of
course, we should not raise animals to such an extent
that feeding the animals would produce a world
ecological crisis or food shortage, and we would not
eat meat to such an extent as to produce our own illhealth. But a certain optimum amount of meat-eating
would seem to be obligatory because it would raise the
net level of both human and animal pleasure without
significant losses due to animal pain. Numerous food
animals can be raised on garbage and rangelands
unsuitable for cultivation.
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Although I would not defend the following
argument, it seems plausible to me to argue on
hedonistic utilitarian grounds that another world (W 3)
populated only by nonhuman animals would be a better
hedonistic world than either WI or W2' Without human
beings converting natural habitats into cities and
fannlands, sentient animals would be free to reproduce
and experience large amounts of pleasure, reduced of
course by the pains of predation, disease, and natural
disaster. Or, perhaps the best world would be a world
with huge nonhuman animal populations and only a
few human shepherds and veterinarians to care for the
animals. If this argument is even plausible, then
hedonistic utilitarians need to take seriously a duty to
bring about the extinction of the human species, unless
human beings have intrinsic value and capacities for
nonhedonistic intrinsic goods that make them superior
to nonhuman animals. If human beings are genuinely
superior, then the better world would seem to be some
version of W2 where human beings would seek to
maximize the populations ofbottl their own species and
other species to the extent warranted by ecological
factors and genuinely qualitative living for all. The
mere plausibility of W3 is a reductio ad absurdum for
the hedonistic utilitarian argument.
Vegetarians may still insist that there is a sense in
which W2 is not a better world than WI: W2 involves
killing and eating animal flesh. If this statement is a
moral judgment (rather than, for example, an aesthetic
one), it assumes that animals have some kind of moral
status beyond mere pleasure-pain sentience that makes
killing them wrong. Consider another world (W4) where
unwanted day-old human babies are painlessly killed
and eaten. ls Will a similar "pain" argument apply?
Surely some humans would derive pleasure from
eating roasted baby, and W4 would then seem to be a
better world than W2 or WI' But, most of us would
object that the act of killing and eating humans for food
makes W4 a worse world, but our objection would not
be a hedonistic one because it assumes that human
beings have an intrinsic value that prohibits killing
and eating them for food. The reason we do not kill
and eat human beings-regardless of the pleasure
produced-is because they have a superior status above
that of other animals. Unless it can be established that
food animals have a human-like status, orat least a status
sufficiently high enough to prohibit killing and eating
them, meat-eaters are free to continue their diets.
Because most food animals are social, probably
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conscious, and to some extent rational, many
vegetarians hold that the animals have a status far above
that of mere sentience.
Finally, vegetarians may contend that W2 can never
be humane: the huge world population and demand
for meat will necessitate intensive animal husbandry
and monstrous slaughterhouses. Meat-eaters are selfdeceived. The fact of the matter is, the meats in the
local supennarkets are the bodies of animals that lived
horrible lives and died cmel deaths. In our capitalistic
economy, one cannot eat meat, even moderately, without
contributing to the market demand for meat and
encouraging the abusive system. It is unrealistic to
envision W2 as a humane world of family farms and
small butcher shops. In our densely urban world, city
dwellers cannot reasonably be expected to buy directly
from small farmers and local butchers. The meat-grain
industry is big business controlled by a monopoly of a
few multinational corporations. In the United States,
one-third ofall raw materials per year goes to livestock
foods, which is more than the entire oil, gas, and coal
industries combined. 16 Allegedly, refaml is impossible.
and therefore the only moral alternative is abstinence
from all flesh foods.
In rebuttal, meat-eaters have argued that abstinence
is not required as long as one's meat consumption is
moderate and as long as one actually works for refonn. 17
I have lived on a family farm, and I know that the
animals can be humanely raised and mercifully
slaughtered. Like poverty, overpopulation, nuclear
armament, and the environment, justice in food
production and distribution is an enonnous problem,
but the enonnity of Lite problem and the economic and
political power of agribusiness does not entail inaction,
especially in a democracy. Conscientious meat-eaters
can join in the movement to help the family farmers.
Through tax breaks and legislation, they can help insure
that lands near cities will be reserved for small farms
that will be used for food production for the neighboring
cities. Small farms raising livestock, vegetables, eggs,
poultry, and dairy products can thrive in these locations.
Farmers' markets and excursions into the country to
buy food would bring consumers directly into contact
with producers. Meat-eaters can work to stop
overpopulation and to pass laws regulating agribusiness.
Many city-dwellers can become weekend farmers.
Gardening can be taught. We can insist that grocers '
supply range-fed beef and barnyard eggs and poultry.
Moderation with reform is not impossible.
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conflict and only in order to prevent an unavoidable
worse evil. Although we also have a duty to do good
according to the Principle of Beneficence, we are
prohibited from doing evil as a means to bring about
good. The Principle of Utility, that the good should be
maximized, is secondary to and derivative from the
Principles of Noninjury and Beneficence. Utilitarian,
teleologically based actions could conceivably justify
blatant wrongs, such as secretly killing innocent persons
in order to bring about good; and, the priority of the
Principle of Noninjury prohibits such acts.
How do these principles apply to meat eating?
Hedonistic utilitarianism would justify meat-eating, as
explained above, as long as the animals live on balance
good lives. They benefit and meat-eaters benefit. In
the evaluative, moral step of their argument, hedonistic
utilitarians appeal to the Principle of Beneficence and
the Principle of Utility. But, unless it can be shown
that death is not a harm to the animals or that the
conflicts are legitimate and unavoidable, this utilitarian
move would be undercut by the prima facie priority of
the Principle ofNoninjury. When the meat is not needed
for nutrition, the pain and death of the animals are
avoidable, illegitimate wrongs, and these acts would
not be justified by appeal to some higher, optional good,
including human or animal welfare. Meat-eating would
be prohibited except in particular cases of legitimate
conflict wherein a worse evil would result without the
meat. When the purpose is merely to achieve some
greater utilitarian good, such as dietary convenience,
gustatory delight, or agricultural efficiency, meat-eating
would not be justified. Only those meat-eaters actually
and unavoidably needing the meat for nutrition would
be justified. Moreover, despite its overwhelming
positive net utility, not even the delightfully good
omnivorous world considered earlier-where the
animals live on heavenly farms and experience only
miniscule pain-would be justified because evil is being
done to bring about good.
The Principle of Noninjury would not prohibit
animal husbandry, but it would probably make the
practice unprofitable. Animals could be farmed as long
as they were given good lives and were allowed to live
out their natural lives, dying of old age. Eggs, milk,
and wool could be obtained, and the bodies of the
deceased, aged animals could be used for food and
clothing. 21
In an insightful version of the Principle of Utility,
Rolston attempts to justify meat-eating by appeal to

In conclusion, the Empirical Argument from Pain
fails, except for the vegan diet, which has morally
significant nutritional limitations. Moreover, hwnane
animal husbandry would increase the balance of
pleasure, not decrease it. Although contemporary
intensive farming methods are deplorable, genuine
efforts for moderation and reform are morally
responsible ways to address the problem. Consumers
of meat are no more responsible for the abuses of
agribusiness than consumers of heating oils are
responsible for the abuses of oil producers. Unless other
moral considerations intervene. and perhaps they do,
omnivores would seem to be free to raise food animals
humanely and to kill them mercifully. Such prohibitions
might be grounded in the essential status or dignity of
the animals as living, conscious, sentient, rational beings
living in a community. IS If it is wrong on such grounds
to exploit and kill animals, then no amount of humane
treatment and good consequences would justify the
abuses.
The Moral Argument from Unnecessary Pain
Finally, the third step in the extended argument needs
attention. Whereas the other two steps were empirical,
this step is moral (or evaluative). The moral maxim
prohibiting unnecessary pain is applied to meat-eating.
For instance, in an emotive passage, Stephen R. L. Chuic
states:
...whatever else be true, whether there be gods
or only atoms, whether men are significantly
superior to non-human animals or no, whether
there be a life to come or this poor accident be
all, this at least cannot be true, that it is proper
to be the cause of avoidable ill. There may be
other moral principles than this, but this at least
is dogma. And if this minimal principle be
accepted, there is no other honest course than
the immediate rejection of all flesh-foods and
most bio-medical research. 19
The Principle of Unnecessary Pain (also called the
Principle of Noninjury) is a deontological (that is,
nonteleological or unconditional) moral principle that
has primafacie priority over all other moral principles,
including the Principle of Beneficence (which is
succinctly put, "do good").20 In other words, pain can
be inflicted (or injury done) only in cases of genuine
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what he calls the "Principle of Value Capture."22
According to this notion, the values of a lower level
are "captured" and carried forward, or transcended, in
a higher level or gestalt. Animal farming and meateating help make possible the qualitatively higher values
of culture, values such as civilization, society, religion,
the fine arts, and intellectual reflection. Rolston's
insight, I think, is the recognition that values are
qualitatively different and that pain is often endW'ed in
order to bring about qualitatively superior goods.
Nevertheless, if it were correct, Rolston's principle
would seem to justify discriminatory practices such as
slavery. According to the Principle of Non-Injury, we
are not justified in inflictill8 such pain on innocent
beings merely to bring about a positive good.
At least two other moves are open to traditional
meat-eaters and animal farmezs. First, as mentioned
earlier, they can argue that food animals are not the
kind of beings to whom morality applies-including
the Principle of Unnecessary Pain. Beings lacking in
full rationality, language, self-consciousness, and
continuity of self-identity across time-that is, merely
sentient beingSo-are devoid of any "self' that can be
harmed or injured. "Pain" in such self-less beings is
not really pain but simply neurophysiological activity.
Their mental states, if such exist at this low level of
psychic activity, are little more than isolated packages
of biochemical, neuronal activities. If killed quickly,
such beings would not be harmed, at least not in any
morally relevant sense.
This response is, I think, conceptually and morally
correct but, its application to most food animals is
empirically mistaken. Except perhaps for fish, food
animals are not merely sentient automatons. Evolutionary and physiological evidence indicates that
animal species comprise a neurophysiological
continuum such that radical separation of homo sapiens,
despite our superiority, is mistaken. Similar brains,
central nervous systems, sensory organs, and behaviors
convince me that the above response is too reductionistic. Cattle, sheep, hogs, and perhaps chickens are
highly sentient and conscious social beings who live in
communities, have memories, communicate with each
other, recognize each other, and solve genuinely novel
problems. 23 Killing such creatures, even painlessly,
does them irreparable harm. Therefore, the Principle
of Unnecessary Pain applies.
The second move is to argue that the Principle of
Noninjury is merely primafacie. At issue are the kinds
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of conflicts that legitimately override the principle.
Nutrition and health are surely significant and legitimate
overriding moral conflicts; no autonomous person can
reasonably be coerced to put their health at risk. Also
legitimate and unavoidable are the following: humans
are by nature omnivores; widespread humane
ovolactovegetarianism is impractical; small-scale
humane ovolactovegetarianism is parasitic on meatbased agriculture; veganism is impossible for many
people; veganism requires supplements; and all forms
of vegetarianism are nutritionally risky. Although not
idealistically unavoidable, several contemporary
sociocultural factors are also relevant: beliefs about
animals are often religiously based and dogmatically
implacable; agribusiness is the most powerful and
wealthy multinational induslry24 and is unlikely to stop
meat production; despite higher regard for animals and
widespread criticisms of behaviorism, most animal
ethologists and psychologists still deny the selfconsciousness of food animals; underdeveloped and
impoveri~hed counlries need to utilize every conceivable
food source, including animals; widespread vegetarianism might disproportionately risk the health of the
laboring classes, especially the rural poor; in a strained,
overpopulated world ecosystem, numerous food
animals could be raised on garbage, noncultivatable
pastures, and other foodstuffs inedible to humans; and,
many philosophical ethicists for good theoretical and
practical reasons consider meat-eating morally
permissible, if not morally justified. Unless food
animals are the kind of beings, like humans, that cannot
be used as mere means to ends, then surely these factors
collectively override the prima facie prohibition
against inflicting unnecessary pain. As a matter of fact,
the pain inflicted is not unnecessary.

Conclusion
Individually and collectively, all three steps in the
vegetarian argument from unnecessary pain fail: the
Empirical Argument from Nutrition because equivocation occurs regarding what is meant by "vegetarian,"
"adequate for human nutrition," and "unnecessary for
nutrition"; the Empirical Argument from Pain because
food animals can be raised humanely and killed
mercifully, and because moderation in consumption and
actual efforts for reform are morally acceptable
responses to the current abuses; and, the Moral
Argument from Unnecessary Pain because the prima
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capitalistic injustices, and spares at least a few animals
pain and death. And perhaps a few of those so spared
are self-conscious.

facie obligation not to inflict pain is overridden by the
nutritional risk of vegetarianism (especially veganism)
and by numerous contemporary sociocultural
circumstances beyond the individual's control.
Collectively, the arguments succeed only for those
individuals who know they can do well on a vegan diet.
Based on the Principle of Unnecessary Pain. perhaps
all persons would then have at least a prima facie duty
to try to be vegans and thereby to discover whether they
would do well on the diet. Nevertheless, because the
Principle of Unnecessary Pain is merely prima facie
and because the risks and sociocultural conflicts are
genuine. I do not think anyone has a duty even to try to
be a vegan.
Briefly discussed a few times in the above analysis,
another argument would trump these considerations.
If food animals are self-conscious and rationally
autonomous, then they would possess the same moral
status that prohibits exploiting and killing humans.
Although most food animals are probably not selfconscious, a few particular individuals perhaps are.25
The issue then becomes whether the status of those
unusually and atypical few confers indefensible moral
status on the entire species. In some cases I think it
does. For instance, the fact that some chimpanzees are
self-conscious entails that murdering any chimpanzee
is criminal. Fortunately, some entire species of food
animals, such as shrimp and fish, are unquestionably
not self-conscious.
Because meat-eating is so deeply entrenched in our
culture, moderation and reform are probably bestboth for the health of individual humans and for the
long-term benefit of the exploited food animals. Meat
does not need to be eaten daily; a few servings weekly
are more than sufficient to off-set any risk in a largely
vegetarian diet. As a means ofreform and in comparison
to abstinence, moderation stands a far better chance of
being widely adopted in our implacably carnivorous
society and thereby of improving the lives of food animals.
The collective failure of these arguments seems to
me to be significantly more tragic than theirindividual
failures. I wish things were otherwise. I wish that we
were not as nutritionally dependent upon meat as we
are and that the sociocultural circumstances were better.
But, we are naturally omnivores. we are grossly
overpopUlated, and we are greedily capitalistic.
Although it should not be imposed on autonomous
persons, being a vegetarian is good because it reduces
the demand on our environment, strikes a blow against
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